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ABSTRACT 
Several models of electric utility behavior have been 
suggested and tested. Among them are profit and revenue maximization 
and cost and revenue minimization. The latter being the stated 
objective of many public utilities. These four models are compared 
empirically by examining power plant choice from 1970 to 1977. The 
net present value (profit) model yields the highest estimated 
likelihood and its parameters are consistent with a priori theory. 
Firms were attempting to maximize their return, while minimizing fixed 
and variable costs. Also, I find no evidence that the difference 
between the allowed rate of return and the cost of capital influenced 
technology choice. 
COMPARING MODELS OF ELECTRIC UTILITY BEHAVIOR* 
Geoffrey Rothwell 
California Institute of Technology 
Although the electricity generation and distribution industry 
has been the subject of many investigations, there is surprisingly 
little consensus regarding the behavioral objectives of electric 
utilities. The two most popular models in empirical studies are (1) 
cost minimization subject to a production constraint and (2) profit 
maximization subject to an allowed rate-of-return constraint. 
Considering only some of the studies since 1978: static cost 
minimization was used in Belinfante (1978) , McFadden (1978), Stevenson 
(1980) , and Gollop and Roberts (1981) . Single-period profit 
maximization under rate-of-return regulation was the maintained 
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Association's 1985 conference and to the Technology Innovation Project 
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hypothesis in Cowing (1978) , Smithson (1978) , Atkinson and Hal vorsen 
(1980) , and Cowing (1982) . Also, Cowing, Small, and Stevenson (1981) , 
Nelson and Wohar (1983) , and Nelson (1984) used cost minimization 
subject to the allowed rate-of-return constraint. Others have been 
proposed: ex ante fixed cost minimization with ex post variable cost 
minimization in Fuss (1978) and multi-period profit maximization in 
Gollop and Karlson (1980) . On studies before 1978, see Cowing and 
Smith (1978) and Rothwell (1985) , Chapter 2. 
Unfortunately, most authors usually compare two non-nested 
models when making conclusions about firm behavior. If profit 
maximization is rejected, the writer generally concludes that firms 
must have been minimizing cost, without considering that they coul d 
have been operating under another behavioral objective, such as 
revenue maximization. This paper contrasts four models of behavior in 
a nested framework: profit maximization, revenue maximization, cost 
minimization, and revenue minimization. 
Each model can be associated with one or more actors: owners, 
managers, regulators, or customers. Owners would prefer the firm to 
behave such that profit, or net present value, is maximized. 
Managers, as owners ' agents, should maximize profit. But given 
incentive structures, e.g., inter-firm promotion tied to firm sales, 
managers may act to maximize revenues. The ideal regulator can be 
modeled as promoting cost-minimization (although this is open to 
debate) . Lastly, customers would prefer revenue minimization, i.e., 
the lowest cost to the consumer. 
Although there may be differences in short and long-run 
behavior, I assume that all are acting in their long-run interest. 
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For example, customers would support allowed rates of return that 
assure the firms ' the long-run viability. Also, considering 
regulatory institutions, I assume that regulators influence technology 
choice only through the allowed rates of return on construction 
expenditures and the rate base. However, they are also involved in 
plant selection through "Public Convenience and Necessity" hearings. 
Even through these proceedings are not explicitly modeled here, I 
assume that in the hearings regulators would act in a manner 
consistent with their dec.iaions regarding rates of return. 
This paper attempts to determine the model that beats 
describes power plant technology selection. In the first two 
sections, I examine the choice of a generating technology under each 
model given a predetermined level of capacity expansion and a constant 
elasticity of demand. Section 3 discusses how the models are nested 
and how they can be compared. The fourth section identifies a maximum 
l ikelihood estimator to empirically distinguish between objective 
functions by examining nuclear and coal unit choice from 1970 to 1977. 
Section 5 presents my estimation results: the net present value 
maximization model yields the highest likelihood and its estimated 
parameters are consistent with a prior theory. In the last section, I 
investigate the influence of rate-of-return regulation. I find that 
the difference between the allowed rate of return and the cost of 
capital had no effect on power plant choice. 
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1. MAXIMIZATION MODELS 
Although many economists assume that electric utilities have a 
continuous production possibilities frontier. this is an inappropriate 
representation of technology choice facing firms in this industry. 
More realistic is the assumption that firms are constrained to choose 
among a discrete number of technologies in providing a given level of 
capacity. This approach has been used by Joakow and Mishkin (1977) 
and Ellis and Zimmerman (1983) . [l] The method assumes that ex ante 
choices are made among technologies with fixed ex post input ratios. 
The problem for the researcher becomes one of modeling the ex ante 
decision-making process. In this and the next section, I consider 
four behavioral models. Throughout this discussion I assume that the 
amount of capacity is determined exogenousl y  to the technology choice 
decision and that firms face a constant elasticity of demand across 
technologies. 
The Net Present Value of a Power Plant 
The profit maximization model holds that a privately owned 
electric utility maximizes the firm's value to its owners by choosing 
the generating technology that yields the highest net present value 
subject to an allowed rate of return. I assume that the firm 
considers each turbine-generator unit as an independent project. 
Although a plant is composed of one or more units, I will use the 
terms "plant" and "unit" interchangeably. Also, I do not consider 
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taxes or decommissioning costs.121 With these caveats, I show that the 
net present value of a power plant can be represented as a function of 
the allowed rate of return (s) ,  the discount rate (r) ,  the 
depreciation rate (d) , the distribution of construction expenditures 
over time (nt) ' the lead time of construction (L) , the plant' s 
lifetime (T) , and the total cost of plant structures and equipment 
(CT) . 
The net present value, NPV0, is the sum of cash flows to the 
firm over the plant' s life discounted to year 0, the year in which the 
firm decides to construct the generating unit. To compare technology 
adoption decisions across firms, NPV0 is expressed in dollars per 
kilowatt-hour.131 Let construction start at t = 1 and continue to L, 
when the plant enters the rate base. Further, let T be the date of 
retirement. So, cash flows can be broken into two periods: 
construction from 1 to L and operation from (L + 1) to (L + 1 + T ) .  
Let L +  = L + 1 and T+ = L + 1 + T. If there is only one addition to 
the rate base at L+ : 
T+ 
NPV0 t�+ 
� L ext 
- [ 
-
(1 + r) t t=l (1 + r) t 
(1) 
where CFt are the cash flows to the firm from t = L+ to T+, ext are 
construction expenditures on the power plant from t = 1 to L, and r 
is the discount rate at time O. 
The cash flows are equal to total revenues, RVt, minus 
expenses, EXt' i.e., CFt = RVt - EXt. Under regulation, total 
revenues equal the allowed rate of return, s, on the rate base, RBt, 
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plus depreciation, DBt, plus EXt: RVt = s RBt + DBt + EXt' where I 
assume that firms use a single value for s over the plant' s life. 
The cash flow from L+ to T+ is equal to the return on the rate base 
plus depreciation, i.e., CFt = s • RBt + DBt. Notice this formulation 
assumes that rates are automatically adjusted for changes in EXt. I 
drop this assumption at the end of this section. 
In the first year of operation, RBL is equal to the plant's 
cost, PT.!41 In each year, the rate base decreases with depreciation. 
I model depreciation with the straight-line method at a depreciation 
rate of d. So, the amount of depreciation is uniform over the 
plant's life, The annual depreciation is equal to the product of d 
and PT. Under these conditions, RBt = [1 - d • (t - L - lll · PT.
[S] 
The cash flow during each year is a function of s, d, L, and PT: 
CFt PT • ( s · [ 1 - d • ( t - L 
- 1 ) ] + d ) 
• 
(2) 
Next, I introduce the convention of representing yearly expenditures 
as a fraction of total expenditures, i.e., ext = mt • PT, where the mt 
are percentage expenditure weights related to PT. With this 
simpl ification, NPV0 can be represented as 
NPVO = 
T+ 
PT • � 
t= + 
C s + d - s • d ·�L - 1) ) 
(1 + r) t 
PT · t � 
t=1 (1 + r) t 
PT SD - PT • MD 
(3) 
where 
SD 
MD 
T+ 
t�+ [ s + d - s • d • (t - L - 1) ] (1 + r) t t mt 
t=l (1 + r) t 
Equation (3) must be adjusted for the regulation of firm 
investment. There are two regulatory methods to compensate the 
util ity for the cost of capital during construction. They are 
Allowance for Funds Used During Construction (AFUDC) and Construction 
Work In Progress (CWIP, pronounced "quip") . Under AFUDC, the firm 
accumulates financing costs in the AFUDC account at a rate of return 
equal to a weighted cost of debt and equity. This is the AFUDC rate, 
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a. The account is added to the rate base when the plant is completed. 
Under CWIP, construction expenditures are added to the rate base at 
the next rate hearing. In the following two sub-sections, I adjust 
the net present value calculation for AFUDC and CWIP regulation. For 
expenditures, I assume that there is no compounding of AFUDC from one 
year to the next.£71 Then, 
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PT 
L ext t-1 = [ c cxt + a • 2+ a • J:= cxj ) , (4) 
where 
A 
�1 � 
CT + (a • �T ) + (a • CT • L nj ) 
L �1 
t=l =1 
a • 
L 'i:=-1 
cl+ [ L n. > 2 
t=l J=l J 
and nt 
5.
CT 
= 
Adjusting the rate of expenditure, mt, for AFUDC, let MD 
CT • (1 + A) 
ND (1 + A) . Substituting for PT and MD in equation (3) : NPVa 
(1 + A) • SD - CT • ND, where NPVa is the net present value 
under AFUDC regulation at time O. 
CT 
NPV Under CWIP Regulation [81 
a more complete discussion of AFUDC and CWIP, see Rothwell (1985) , The net present value under CWIP, NPVc, is CT
. (SD - ND) plus
Chapter 1 .  
NPV Under AFUDC Regulation 
With AFUDC regulation, total plant cost, PT, is the sum of 
construction expenditures, CT, plus the AFUDC account at time L. I 
approximate AFUDC during a particular year by averaging expenditures 
at the beginning and end of the year, i.e., ext / 2 ,  and mul tiplying 
by the AFUDC rate. £61 Al though AFUDC is granted on previous 
the sum of discounted cash flows during construction, CFC. The 
revenues in period t, CFct (t � L) , are a function of the cumulative 
value of construction expenditures: 
CF ct 
\=1 
s • Fl cxJ s · CT • 
�1 
n. 
1 J 
• 
where the summation extends to (t - 1) , instead of t, because 
( S) 
expenditures during one year do not enter the rate base until the next 
year.[91 Note that CWIP is not depreciated until the plant enters
commercial service. The total discounted return to CWIP during 
construction is 
CF c CT 
t  �:
CT · SN , 
� 
t (1 + r) 
9 
(6) 
where SN is appropriately defined. Then NPVc = CT • [SD + SN - NDi. 
To summarize net present value maximization, I introduce a parameter, 
4, which is equal to 1 under AFUDC and equal to zero under CWIP:[lO] 
NPV CT • SD + 4 · CT • A • SD (7) 
+ (1 - 4) CT • SN CT • ND , 
Regulatory Lag 
Finally, consider the problem of regulatory lag in 
compensating the firm for increases in variable costs. During the 
mid-1970s, firms faced high inflation rates for fuel and labor. Under 
regulation before automatic fuel adjustment clauses, rates were based 
on costs experienced in a prior test year. This would mean that firms 
could not raise rates until after they experienced a rise in costs. 
While it is difficult to determine expected lasts under regulatory 
lag, a net present value maximizer would prefer technologies with 
lower variable costs, because the lower the variable cost, the smaller 
the absolute loss under inflation. To represent this loss, I 
introduce a parameter, p, on the discounted value of variable
expenses. The discount multiplier is the geometric series, present 
worth factor. For the first year of operation it is equal to 
C 1 - Cl + e\T • (1 + rl-T l 
(r - e) 
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where e is the price escalation rate. If e = r, then T / (1 + r) is 
used. Further, this is brought to year O with (1 + r) -L: 
ED EX • [1 - Cl + e\
T • (1 + r)-T ] 
[ (r - e) • (1 + r) LJ 
where ED are the discounted variable expenses at the time of 
technology selection. With this addition, equation (7) becomes 
NPV CT SD + 4 • CT • A • SD 
+ (1 - 4) CT • SN - CT • ND P · ED • 
Revenue Maximization 
(7 ' ) 
Revenue maximization subject to an allowed rate of return was 
discussed in Baumol and Klevorick (1970) and Bailey and Malone (1970) . 
Also, Fox (1975) found that between 1960 and 1967, electric utilities 
behaved like revenue maximizers constrained by their cost of capital . 
Revenues are equal to the return on the rate base plus 
depreciation plus expenses. The discounted total revenues under AFUDC 
regulation, DTRa, per kilowatt hour are 
DTR a 
T+ (s • RBt + DBt + EXt) 
t�+ (1 + r) t 
CT • (1 + A) • SD + ED 
(8) 
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Similarly, discounted total revenues under CWIP regulation, DTR
c, 
equal CT (SD + SN) + ED. Notice the differences between DTR and 
NPV: DTR does not include investment expenditures, ND, because they 
are not directly charged to customers. These expenditures are 
recovered through the return on the rate base and through 
depreciation. On the other hand, firms behaving as revenue maximizers 
prefer greater variable expenses, unlike firms maximizing profit 
operating under regulatory lag. 
2. MINIMIZATION MODELS 
Next, consider the cost and revenue minimization models. The 
cost model has at least three variants: minimization of discounted 
total costs (DTC), minimization of discounted fixed costs (DFC), and 
minimization of discounted variable costs (DVC). The first has been 
used extensively in previous empirical investigations of electric 
utility technology choice. Fixed-cost, or capital-cost, minimization, 
(as a reaction to inadequate rates of return) has been proposed by 
some electric utility executives and is discussed in Chao, Gilbert, 
and Peck (1984) . The minimization of variable cost was suggested by 
Joskow and Mishkin (1977) , p. 733, to explain their statistical 
results. Further, these models can be interpreted in the Fuss (1978)
framework: DFC is the ex ante minimization of fixed costs and DVC is 
the ex poste minimization of variable costs. 
The discounted total cost model can be represented as 
12 
DTC 
t 
ext 
t=l (1 + r)t 
'f± 
EXt + 
tk.+ (1 + r)t 
(9) 
CT • ND + ED 
Note that under DFC the firm minimizes the present value of 
construction expenditures per kilowatt-hour, CT • ND, and that under 
DVC the firm minimizes the present value of expenses per kilowatt-hour 
during the plant's lifetime, ED. Given that OTC = DFC + DVC, the 
latter two models are nested within the former, allowing easy 
comparison. Because both AFUDC and CWIP regulation increase cash 
flows to the firm, but do not increase costs, these models are the 
same under both forms of regulation. 
Reauired Reyenues 
Although economists have suggested revenue maximization as one 
way of describing regulated firm behavior, the electric utility 
industry has proposed another objective function: minimization of 
revenue. The technique of required revenue minimization, i.e., the 
minimization of revenues required for successful operation, was 
developed in Jeynes (1968) and EPRI (1978) , where successful operation 
was defined in U.S. FPC v. Hope Natural Gas, 32o·u.s. 591 (1944) . In 
Hope the court held that rates should enable the company to maintain 
its financial integrity, to attract capital, and to compensate its 
investors for risk. The model is used so extensively by electric 
utilities that many firms have a revenue requirements department, for 
example, at Pacific Gas and Electric in California. I label the 
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revenue minimization model as Discounted Required Revenue (DRR). When 
choosing among technologies under DRR, the firm attempts to minimize 
the variables found in the total revenue maximization model, i.e., 
under AFUDC: min [ CT • (1 + A) • SD + ED ] and under CWIP: min 
[ CT • (SD + SN) + ED ] . Hence, DRR and DTR must be distinguished by 
the signs of the estimated parameters. Until they are distinguished, 
I will refer to both models as DRV, discounted revenues. 
3. COMPARING MODELS 
The four models can be compared most easily when they are 
nested. For example, the revenue model is nested within the profit 
model, and the variable cost model is nested within the revenue model. 
When two models are nested, their equivalence can be determined by 
considering the difference in their estimated log likelihoods. Two 
times this difference is distributed as a x2, with degrees of freedom 
equal to the number of restrictions. I will refer to the value as 
"Statistic" in Table 3, discussed in Section 5. To estimate the 
likelihood of each model, I examine the choice between nuclear and 
coal technologies by the electric utilities from 1970 to 1977. Unlike 
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information on decision variables differently for each technology.[
ll] 
Let Vj represent the value of technology j to the firm and let Pij be 
-1, 0, +1, or -p (the parameter associated with regulatory lag in
NPV), according to the model under consideration. For two 
technologies the firm is interested in the difference between vl and 
v2 : 
v1 
- V2 = 
+ 
+ 
p11 · CT1 • (SD1 + A • A1 SD1 + (1 - A) · SN1UO) 
P
12 · CT2 (SD2 + A A2 • SD2 + (1 - A) SN2) 
<P21 CT1 • ND1 
- p22 · CT2 • ND2 
(p31 • ED1 
- P32 
. ED2) 
As presented in this equation, the expected signs are 
NPV: [plj' P2j' P3jl 
= [ +l, -1, -p 
DTR: !Plj' P2j' P3jl 
= [ +1, 0, +1 
DRR: [plj' P2j' P3jl 
= [ -1, 0, -1 
DTC: !Plj, P2j, P3jl 
= [ 0, -1, -1 
DFC: [plj' P2j' P3jl 
= [ 0, -1 , 0 
DVC: [plj' P2j' P3j
l 
= [ o. 0, -1 
technology diffusion models where the adoption of a particular Although Joskow and Mishkin (1977) and Ellis and Zimmerman 
technology usually depends on jndustry characteristics, here, the 
maximizing (minimizing) firm adopts technology 1, if its value is 
greater (less) than the other option. 
I follow the specification of Ellis and Zimmerman (1983) by 
allowing parameters to vary across technologies, i.e., firms weigh 
(1983) introduce two discounted expense (ED) variables, one for fuel 
costs and the other for operation and maintenance expenses, their 
models are most similar to total cost minimization, DTC. Joskow and 
Mishkin examined fossil fuel plants built between 1952 and 1965. They 
found that as variable expenses for a particular technology increased, 
the probability of adopting that technology decreased. They did not 
find the parameter associated with the capital cost variable to be 
significant. On the other hand, Ellis and Zimmerman, examining coal 
and nuclear plant orders from 1970 to 1978, found that only the 
parameters associated with coal operating and maintenance costs and 
nuclear capital costs to be significant, positive and negative, 
respectively. Given that the parameter on coal fuel cost was also 
positive, although with a t-statistic of only 1.14, the parameter on 
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ED2 should be positive (or negative if ED2 is subtracted). In section 
s. I give my estimation results. The parameters generally conform to 
these expectations. However, before further discussion, I present the 
estimator. 
4. THE PROBABILITY OF TECHNOLOGY CHOICE 
In discussing the estimator, I follow Hausman and Wise (1978) 
and Daganzo (1979). Let Xij be a vector of characteristics related 
to technology j as perceived by firm i. Some of these are constant 
across all firms, e.g., the plant's lifetime, Tj. Others are 
estimated for each firm. These are the lead time, the AFUDC mark-up, 
the construction cost, and variable expenses (Lij' Aij' CTij' and 
EXij). Also, there are attributes, ai' that are firm specific and 
constant across all technologies. These are the weighted cost of 
capital for firm i, ri, the AFUDC rate, ai' and the allowed rate of 
return, s .
• 
l121 (These data are described in the Appendix.) Using 1 
this notation, the probability of choosing technology 1, �1• is 
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prob[ V1 <xil' ai) > v2 <xi2' ai) l. The technology characteristics and
firm attributes are transformed into parameters and variables, Pkj and 
Zijk' where k ranges from 1 to 3 .  By comparing observed choices with 
the Zijk' the parameters are estimated using a maximum likelihood 
technique. (Note that the Pkj are parameters for the average firm.) 
Further, there are unobserved characteristics for each 
technology that may increase or decrease the value of a generating 
unit. Let the sum of the neglected variables be equal to p0, a 
constant component, plus 8, a random term. I assume that the 8 are 
normally distributed with mean 
normally distributed with mean 
probability of adopting �l is 
zero and variance a2• Then, e is e 
P
0 and variance a� . So, the 
prob l Po1 + � Zilk • Pkl + 81 > Po2 + � zi2k • Pk2 + 82 (11) 
This expression can be rearranged by moving the non-stochastic 
terms to one side and the random terms to the other: 
prob[ Po + � Zilk • Pk1 - � zi2k • Pk2 11 l . (12) 
where p0 = p01 - p02 and�= <£2 - 81>. If the iij are normal, then� 
is the sum of normal variates, and is thus normal itself. If I assume 
that the normal variates have zero means, then � has a mean of zero 
and a variance of a2• Dividing both sides of the inequality in 11 
equation (12) by a11, yields a N(O, 1) variate on the left hand side. 
Let 
D
il 
[ fl 0 + � Zilk • fl kl - � zi2k • flk2 l 
CJ 
Tl 
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Then the probability, Pil' of observing �l is equal to the cumulative 
probability of observing Dil 
.ll31 
Dl 
pl L c1< ii> di] <ll(Dl) ' 
where cJ(ij) is a standard normal density function and <ll(D1) is a 
standard normal cumulative distribution function. 
(13) 
Estimation is done with binary probit. Cl4l If the observations 
can be appropriately modeled as a sample of independent drawings, the 
log of the likelihood function is equal to 
log L 
N 2 
} ) �iJ" •log Pi. f=;-1 J=1 J 
where N is the sample size and �ij 
= 1 if firm i chooses technology 
j and equal to zero otherwise. Across a sample of technology choices, 
the probit estimator selects values for (flkj / all) that maximize the 
likelihood of observing the realized outcomes. Note that with probit 
the flkj are not identifiable without some a priori specification of 
the elements of all. Given that I have no such a priori information, I 
normalize (all) to one. Although the scale of an estimated parameter 
is unidentified, the sign of the estimate can be identified. Further, 
the ratio of two coefficients is also identifiable. This precludes 
drawing certain conclusions, but my primary objective is to evaluate 
the explanatory power of each model. I do this by comparing the 
estimated values of the likelihood functions. 
S. RESULTS 
I am interested in determining the model that best describes 
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the technology adoption behavior of electric utilities during the 
1970s. This can be done in two ways. In some situations the models 
are nested. This allows testing by constraining certain parameters to 
zero. In other cases, models can be distinguished only by the signs 
of the estimated coefficients. For these, I rely on asymptotic t-
statistics. To aid this discussion, correlation coefficients are 
presented in Table 1. Also, Table 2 shows the estimated parameters; 
and Table 3 compares the estimated models. In the latter, a contrast 
is made between the log of the likelihood values at convergence for 
the unrestricted and the restricted models. The acceptance or 
rejection of the null hypothesis is shown in the last column. To 
allow visual comparison among the models, there are diagrams 
accompanying each table. Where the null hypothesis is rejected, 
arrows point in the direction of the dominant model, i.e. , the model 
with the higher log likelihood. 
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Estimated Likelihoods 
Considering the cost minimization models, the total cost and 
fix cost models appear to be equivalent, while DTC dominates the 
variable cost model. See the first row of Table 3. Also, notice the 
low correlation between the dependent variable, CHOICE, and the 
discounted variable expenses (ED1 and ED2) in Table 1. There are at 
least two reasons for this: (1} During the 1970s, firms may have been 
more interested in capital costs than in variable costs. A reasonable 
conclusion given the financial condition of many utilities during that 
period. But this seems to contradict the findings of Joskow and 
Mishkin (1977), i. e, during the 1950s and 1960s, capital costs did not 
appear to play a significant role in power plant technology selecti.on. 
Hence, there may have been a change in electric utility behavior 
between 1965 and 1970. Or, (2) expected variable costs may not be 
well modelecl because of the uncertainty in the rates of increase in 
fuel prices that persisted throughout the 1970s. I have calculated 
fuel prices in 1980 dollars using realized inflation rates. These 
rates could differ widely from expected rates at the time of 
technology selection. 
The cost models are also compared with the profit and revenue 
models in Table 3. Given the results regarding the insignificance of' 
the variable cost parameters, it is not surprising to find that the 
revenue model, DRV, dominates DVC. Although equivalence of DFC and 
D'I'C with the profit model, NPV, is rejected at the 95% level, 
equivalence would not be rejected at the 97.5% level. (But, as I show 
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in the next section, reestimation with a slightly different 
specification yields rejection at the 99% level. ) The closeness of DTC 
and DFC to NPV is a result of the correlation between the SDj and NDj ' 
i. e. , the likelihood changes little with the addition of SDj to models 
with NDj. 
This closeness is also found in the comparison of DRV and NPV. 
Although one can reject their equivalence at the 97. 5% level with this 
specification, equivalence cannot be rejected at the 95% level under a 
slightly different specification. Also, notice that while DTC and DFC 
cannot be compared directly with DRV, the log likelihoods of all three 
models are similar. In sum, while the profit model appears to be the 
best description of electric utility behavior, it is difficult to rank 
the other models based on their estimated likelihoods. Thus, I turn 
to the parameters' signs. 
Estimated Parameters 
In Section 3, I presented the expected signs of the parameters 
for each model. Here, I discuss the �kj' beginning with the 
parameters associated with the discounted variable costs. Although I 
found that the EDj did not play a significant role in technology 
choice, the signs of �31 and �32 are not always insignificant. When 
significant, they are negative. This supports the findings of Joskow 
and Mishkin (1977) and of Ellis and Zimmerman (1983) ,ClS] It implies 
minimization of variable costs, lending support to the cost and 
revenue minimization models. But notice that the p3j are both 
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positive, although insignificant, in DVC. So, DVC should be rejected 
because its parameters do not conform to a priori expectations. 
Next, consider the capital cost (NDj) and rate base (SDj) 
variables. In the total and fixed cost models, the p2j are positive. 
In the profit and revenue models, the p1j are positive and 
significant, while the p2j are negative in NPV.
[161 The p2j could be 
positive in the cost models because the NDj are proxies in the cost 
models for the return on the rate base, SDj. Thus DTC and DFC are 
rejected because they too do not support a priori theory. Further, 
neither revenue maximization or minimization can be accepted. Revenue 
maximization is rejected because firms were minimizing variable costs. 
Revenue min:Lmization is rejected because firms were maximizing the 
return on the rate base. Apparently, firms were attempting to 
maximize the return on the rate base while minimizing fixed and 
variable costs. Thus, the only model that satisfies a priori 
expectations is the profit (net present value) model. This is similar 
to the conclusion reached above, i.e., while it is difficult to choose 
among the cost and revenue models, the profit model most accurately 
describes firm behavior. But if firms were maximizing profit, was 
there a tendency toward overcapitalization? I discuss this question 
in the next section. 
6. THE ALLOWED RATE OF RETURN 
Given the dominance of the profit maximization model: did the 
allowed rate of return significantly influence technology choice? Or, 
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does a large difference between the allowed rate of return (s) and the 
cost of capital (r) influence firm behavior? According to the model 
proposed in Averch and Johnson (1 962) , the difference should affect 
the choice of factor inputs. As Baumol and Klevorick (1970) show, 
smaller differences should lead to overcapitalization. 
To distinguish between the allowed rate of return and the cost 
of capital, let v = s - r. I substitute for s = r + v in SD and SN in 
equations (3) and (6) . 
SD = 
+ 
SN = 
T 
t�L 
T 
t�L 
[ r + d - Cr · d • (t-=-JJ__l 
(1 + r) t 
[ y - y • d • (t - L) I 
(1 + r) t 
RD + VD ; and 
L t-1 n. L t-1 n 
r · [ f= + v · [[ � 
t=l =1 (1 + r) t t=l J=l (1 + r) t 
RN + VN • 
I introduce a parameter, p, to examine reaction to the difference 
between the allowed rate of return and the cost of capital: 
SD = RD + p · VD and SN = RN + p · VN. Previously, I have assumed 
( 14) 
( 15) 
that p = 1. To test the significance of the rate of return premium 
(v) I estimate p using a non-linear specification and compare the log 
likelihood to models where p = 1 and p = O.ci7J Parameters and 
likelihoods are presented in Table 4 .  
The log likelihoods are compared in Table 5. All models where 
p is constrained to zero are equivalent to models where p is 
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unconstrained. Where p = 1, equivalence between the constrained and 
unconstrained models would be rejected at the 90% level. This means 
that the specification of an unconstrained p and p constrained to zero 
are superior to the previous implied specification of p = 1. Under 
these new specifications, NPV and DRV appear to be equivalent 
(although this would be rejected at the 90% level) and their log 
likelihoods are significantly higher than those of the cost models. 
For example, the equivalence of the profit and total cost models is 
rejected at the 99% level. Therefore, p, the preference weight on the 
allowed rate of return premium, does not appear to be significantly 
different from zero. In choosing between nuclear and coal 
technologies, firms were not influenced by the allowed rate of return 
premium. 
CONCLUSIONS 
In summary, I find evidence to conclude that net present value 
(profit) maximization best explains electric utility technology choice 
during the 1970s. This was shown by comparing the log likelihoods of 
the profit, revenue, and cost models and by examining the signs of the 
estimated parameters. Firms appear to have been choosing technologies 
to maximize their return on the rate base, while minimizing fixed and 
variable costs. 
These results are consistent with almost all the empirical 
studies in this area. Cost minimization was rejected in Spann (1974), 
Courville (1974) , Petersen (1975) , Cowing (1978) , Atkinson and 
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Halvorsen (1980) , and Cowing (1982) . I have also rejected cost
minimization. Further, the parameter attached to the allowed rate of 
return premium was insignificant in Boyes (1976) , Smithson (1978) , 
Gallop and Karlson (1980) , Nelson and Wohar (1983) , and Nelson (1984) . 
I have also found the allowed rate of return parameter to be 
insignificant. While accepting profit maximization, I reject the 
influence of the difference between the allowed rate of return and the 
cost of capital. Although cost and revenue minimization are rejected, 
this does not mean that regulation was necessarily ineffective. 
Regulation may have reduced profit maximizing behavior by electric 
utilities from what it might have been otherwise. However, it is not 
surprising to find in an economic system based on profit incentives 
that regulated firms would be maximizing net present value. 
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DATA APPENDIX 
Between 1970 and 1977 almost all new power plants larger than 
100 megawatts employed either nuclear or coal technology. To insure 
comparability between the two technologies, I only considered 
generating units greater than 500 megawatts. Further, I was limited 
to observations with information on the turbine-generator order date. 
I began with the "Generating Unit Reference File, " US DOE tape number 
PB82-150442, and eliminated units not adhering to these criteria. 
Also, I deleted multiple units ordered in the same year for the same 
plant site. This resulted in a sample of 87 observations. 
Capital Costs 
Given this sample, I collected data on the technologies' 
characteristics (Xij) and the firms' attributes Cai) .  Some of these 
characteristics were assumed to be constant across firms. These 
include the distribution of construction expenditures over time, ntj' 
and the plant's lifetime, T. The ntj for each technology were taken 
from Komanoff (1980) based on Mooz (1978) . The lifetime of a unit is 
30 years for each technology, following EPRI (1978) , pp. XII-16 , 17. 
With straight-line depreciation, the depreciation rate, d, is 
approximately 0.033. 
Three technology characteristics were forecast: the lead time , 
the AFUDC mark-up, and the construction cost. On-line dates 
conditional on order dates were predicted from cross-section estimates 
of lead times (see Rothwell (1985) , Chapter 4, Tables 4.6.1 and 4.6.2) 
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using the following form: (log of lead time) = p0 + p1 • (start date)
+ p2 • (log of size) + p3 (log of wage rate) + p4 • (log of 
materials price) . The lead time, Lij' is the difference between the
order date and the predicted on-line date. The AFUDC mark-up, Aij' 
was calculated using equation (4) . (See the section "NPV Under AFUDC 
Regulation.") The AFUDC rate is 
ai ii • ( 1 - ECi ) + 
(zi, t-2 + zi.t-1 + zi , t) 
3 ECi 
where ECi is the equity to total capitalization ratio and zit is the 
realized rate on common equity in period t. The interest rate on 
debt, i ,  is from Moody's sources. The rate of return on common 
equity, z, and the capitalization ratio, EC, were from Statistics of 
Privately Owned Electric Utilities. I assumed that r. and a. are l. l. 
equal, as suggested by EPRI (1978) , p. V-3. Allowed rates of return , 
si, are available in the National Association of Regulatory Utility 
Commissioners' (NARUC's) annual report on utility regulation , section 
F: "Basis of Rate of Return." 
Plant costs in 1980 dollars, CTij' for both the nuclear and
coal alternatives were predicted from cross-section estimations of 
Cobb-Douglas cost functions, using parameters from Tables 4.13.1 and 
4.13.2 in Rothwell (1985) , Chapter 4. The data are similar to those 
in Zimmerman (1982) and Joskow and Rose (1985) . I assumed that the 
expected capacity factor , CFij' decreases at a uniform rate from 80 
percent in 1970 for both technologies to the values listed for 1980 in 
US DOE/NBB (1982) , p. 16. 
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Variable Costs 
Variable expenses include the cost of fuel and the cost of 
operation and maintenance. The fuel expense is the product of the 
total fuel consumed (TF) and the price per unit of fuel (pf) divided
by the annual net generation (Tkwh) , i . e. ,  TF · Pr I Tkwh. This can 
be manipulated to introduce the heat rate (HTR) equal to the energy 
content of a unit of fuel measured in British Thermal Units (BTU) 
divided by the annual net generation , i.e. , HTR = ( TF • BTU / Tkwh) : 
TF • Pr !r!:J! -
Tkwh 
• BTU 
TF 
• 
BTU 
Tkwh 
� 
BTU HTR • F , 
where F is the fuel price per BTU. The heat rate for new fossil-
fuel plants changed little from 1960 (10, 356) to 1980 (10, 467) , 
according to the "Steam Station Cost Survey , "  Electrical World. 
October 1967 and November 1981. (The average heat rate improved 
slightly before 1970, then fell back to its 1960 level by 1980.) I 
assumed that the heat rate for coal units was reasonably approximated 
by the Electrical World data. For nuclear plants , I used EPRI's 
assumption of 10, 400 as an average annual heat rate. See EPRI (1978) , 
p. XII-17. 
The price per BTU of coal for each state was taken from US 
DOE /NBB (1982) , pp. 262-63. These prices were inflated to 1980 
dollars using the Bureau of Labor Statistics' Producer Price Index for 
coal. Given that the price of nuclear fuel changed little from region 
to region, EPRI' s  estimate of 0.54 dollars /million BTU was applied to 
all nuclear plants. This 1977 figure was inflated 1980 dollars with 
2 8  
the BLS Producer Price Index for "Fuels, Related Products , and Power." 
Operation and maintenance expenses are less well defined. They 
include supervisory , engineering , and maintenance labor , as well as 
the materials used to maintain plant structures and equipment. Rather 
than calculating these expenses directly , I increased the estimates of 
fuel costs by the ratio of total production costs to fuel expenses for 
nuclear and coal plants for each of seven regions from US DOE/EIS 
(1982) , p. 16. Let total variable costs , EXij' equal 
HTRij 
Fij • TFRij' where TFRij is the ratio of total cost to fuel 
cost. To calculate the present value of a stream of payments over the 
plant's lifetime , I assume that coal and nuclear plant variable 
expenses escalate at the rates of 6.S and 8.0 percent , respectively. 
(These are the e in Section 1.) This follows EPRI (1978) , pp. XI-3-5. 
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TABLE 1: CORRELATION COEFFICIENTS TABLE 2: PARAMETER ESTIMATION RESULTS 
NPV DRV DTC DFC DVC 
CHOICE SDl SD2 NDl ND2 EDl ED2 Profit Revenue Total Fixed Variable 
Cost Cost Cost 
CHOICE 1.000 
BO 5.79** 3.21** 5.47** 4.45** -1.24** BO 
SDl -0.341 1.000 (1.77) (1.15) (1.61) (1.05) (0.57) 
SD2 -0.438 0.792 1.000 SDl 0.21** 0.03* xxxx xx xx xxxx Bll 
(0,10) (0.02) 
NDl -0.409 0.934 o. 753 1.000 
SD2 0.22•• -0.11•• xxxx xx xx xx xx B12 
ND2 -0.472 0.705 0.937 0.786 1.000 (0.09) (0.04) 
EDl 0.185 0.164 -0.045 -0.078 -0.279 1.000 NDl -0.19* xxxx 0.03 0.01 xx xx B21 
(0.10) (0.02) (0.02) 
ED2 0.086 0.146 0.243 -0 .056 0.069 0.444 1.000 
ND2 -0.09 xx xx 0.12•• 0.09** xx xx B22 
CHOICE = 1 if nuclear, = 0 if coal (0.10) (0.03) (0.03) 
EDl -1.29 0.12 -1.59 xxxx 1.23 B31 
(1.39) (1.04) (1.22) (0.81) 
ED2 -2.55 -4.23** -3 .23* xxxx 0.05 B32 
(2.07) (1.87) (1.81) (1.25) 
LL -35.67 -39.78 -38.98 -40.65 -56.24 
Log Likelihood (LL) at Zero: -60.30 •: Significant at 90% level 
(Asymptotic Standard Errors) ••: Significant at 95% level 
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TABLE 3: COMPARISON OF LOG LIKELIHOODS TABLE 4: ESTIMATION RESULTS, RHO CONSTRAINED AND UNCONSTRAINED 
NPV DRV NPV DRV 
DFC [1] DTC [2] DVC RHO = 0 RHO Unconstrained 
-40.65 ----- -38.98 <----- -S6.24 
I I I BO 6.04** 6.07•• 6.1s•• 6.19** BO 
C3 l I C4l I [SJ I (1.82) (1.70) (1.98) (1. 74) 
I v v 
I NPV [6] DRV SDl 0.26* 0.04** 0.26* 0.04* Bll 
+------------) -35.67 <----- -39.78 (0.14) (0.02) (0.16) (0.02) 
SD2 0.37** o.1s•• 0.38** o.1s•• B12 
(0.13) (0.04) (0.14) (0.04) 
NDl -0.21• xx xx -0.21 xxxx B21 
(0.13) (0.16) 
Unrestricted Restricted Statistic df Critical Null? 
ND2 -0.22• xxxx -0.22 xxxx B22 
[1] DTC DFC 3.34 2 S.99 Accept (0.13) (0.14) 
[2] DTC DVC 34.52 2 S.99 Reject ED! -1.90 -1.96 -2.06 -2.11 B31 
(1.31) (1.25) (1.SS) (1.SS) 
[3] NPV DFC 9.96 4 9.49 Reject 
ED2 -3 .03 -4.01** -2.89 -3.89• B32 
[4] NPV DTC 6.62 2 S.99 Reject (2.02) (1.89) (2.64) (2.32) 
[ S] DRV DVC 32.92 2 S.99 Reject RHO o.oo o.oo -0.08 -0.07 RHO 
(0.37) (0.42) 
[6] NPV DRV 8.22 2 S.99 Reject 
LL -33.85 -36.37 -33 .82 -36.35 
Log Likelihood (LL) at Zero: -60.30 •: Significant at 90% level 
(Asymptotic Standard Errors) ••: Significant at 95% level 
DTC 
NPV 
DRV 
[1] 
[2] 
[3] 
[4] 
[5] 
[6] 
[7] 
[8] 
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TABLE 5: COMPARISON OF CONSTRAINED AND UNCONSTRAINED RHO FOOTNOTES 
RHO = 1 Unconstrained 
-38.98 
I
c11 I
[2] v 
-35A67 ----- -33.82 
I
l4l I cs1 I
I [7] I
-39.78 ----- > -36.35 
Unrestricted Restricted Statistic df 
NPV DTC 10.32 2 
NPV NPV 3.70 1 
NPV NPV 0.06 1 
NPV DRV 8.22 2 
NPV DRV 5.06 2 
NPV DRV 5. 04 2 
DRV DRV 6 :'86 1 
DRV DRV 0.04 1 
RHO = 0 
[3] 
----- -33.85 
I
l6l I
[ 8] I
----- -36.37 
Critical Null? 
5.99 Reject 
3.84 Accept 
3.84 Accept 
5.99 Reject 
5.99 Accept 
5.99 Accept 
3.84 Reject 
3.84 Accept 
1. The models developed by these authors are similar to the 
discounted total cost model (DTC) presented in the Section 2. 
2. On taxation, normalized accounting methods, · and accelerated 
depreciation, see Rothwell (1983) . 
3. This implies that fixed costs are divided by (plant size) x (the 
hours per year) x (the capacity factor) . The capacity factor is 
the ratio of realized generation to potential generation. It is 
discussed in the Appendix. 
4. Also, there is an allowance for working capital in the rate base • .
Working capital, as defined by FERC equals (materials and 
supplies) + (prepayments) + (research and development 
expenditures) + 0.125 • (operation and maintenance expenses -
purchased power) - 0.06 • (federal income taxes) . See US DOE, 
Statistics of Privately Owned Electric Utilities in the United 
States, any year, "Selected Financial Ratios." While prepayments, 
research and development, and taxes are negligible, materials and 
supplies and purchased power are not. But these two items should 
be the same across technologies. However, operation and 
maintenance expenses will differ. But given that the return to 
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variable costs are equal to 12.5% of the allowed rate of return, 
i.e., between 1 and 2% of expenses, the influence on technology 
adoption should be minimal. 
5. This assumes that all plant costs are allowed into the rate base. 
Although the assumption may be unfounded in the 1980s, it was 
probably a universally held expectation before 1977. the last 
year of this study. 
6. I assume a uniform expenditure rate during a given year. For 
empirical work, I calculate AFUDC on a monthly basis. 
7. Compounding AFUDC, i.e., granting AFUDC on previous AFUDC, became 
standard regulatory practice only in the late 1970s. See 
Pomerantz and Suel flow (1975), p. 174. 
8. To simplify modeling, I ignore the offsetting of AFUDC. Under an 
AFUDC offset, construction expenditures are capitalized, as in 
AFUDC regulation, and the rate of return on CWIP is set equal to 
the difference between the allowed rate of return and the AFUDC 
rate. For a model with AFUDC offset, see Rothwell (1985), 
Chapter 3. 
9. This occurs unless some provision is made for either (1) a future 
test year or (2) automatic increases subject to refund after the 
rate hearing. The first still requires returning continually to 
the regulatory commission. The second has been adopted in some 
j urisdictions in the 1 980s. 
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10. As an approximation to partial CWIP, let A 
= 0.5 in those states 
that all ow some CWIP in the rate base. A l ist of these states 
can be found in Rothwell (1985), pp. 31-33. 
11. Preliminary tests showed that this specification was superior to 
one where parameters were restricted to the. same values for both 
technologies. This implies that firms did not give equal weight 
to cost information on coal and nuclear plants. It also suggests 
that there are aspects of the selection process that have not be 
adequately modeled. 
12. I assume that the capital market charges the same risk premium 
for all technologies. If the level of risk is technology 
specific, some adjustment for uncertainty must be made. Two 
approaches have been considered in Rothwell (1984) and Rothwell 
(1985), Chapter 3. 
13. The probability is also a function of observing plant attributes. 
i.e., the probability density function of the technology 
attributes. Generally, the density function does not depend on 
the parameters and can be deleted in the maximum likel ihood 
estimation. 
14. I estimated these models with Statistical Software Tools written 
by Jeffrey Dubin and R. Douglas Rivers of the California 
Institute of Technology. 
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15. I have incorporated the negative sign of the coal variables into 
the estimation, easing the comparison of signs across 
technologies. For a direct comparison with Ellis and Zimmerman 
(1983) , one must reverse signs on the �k2• 
16. The signs and significance of �21 and �22 in NPV conform to the 
findings of Ellis and Zimmerman (1983) . The coal capital cost 
parameter is insignificant in both Ell is and Zimmerman and in 
NPV. Also, the value of their nuclear capital cost parameter is 
-0.3144 with a standard error of 0.1408. This is close to my 
estimate of -0.1855 with a standard error of 0.1010. 
17. The algorithm was written by Paul Ruud of the University of 
Cal ifornia, Berkeley, based on Berndt, Hall, Hall, and Hausman 
(1974) . 
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